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Chance Deference De Se
j. dmitri gallow ∗
Abstract: Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first
place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second
place, they face difficulties in cases where you’ve lost track of the time. I provide
a generalisation of these principles which handles these problem cases. The gen-
eralisation has surprising consequences for Adam Elga’s Sleeping Beauty puzzle.
1 | introduction
Principles of chance deference tell you to treat information about the future
objective chances as a particularly strong form of evidence. Let t be some fu-
ture time. Then, so long as circumstances are ordinary and you don’t have any
information about what happens after t, a principle of chance deference says
that, given that the time t objective chance of ‘p’ is n%, you should be n% sure
that ‘p’ is true.1,2
Principles like this run into two kinds of problems. In the first place, they
give bad advice about a priori knowable contingencies. Consider the following
example, from John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio:3 tomorrow, we
will draw 100 names from an urn, and the person whose name is drawn will
win a prize. Before the draw takes place, we introduce the name ‘Lucky’ for the
person whose name is actually drawn. We don’t yet know the truth-conditions
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1. Following philosophical tradition, I reserve the world ‘chance’ for objective probabilities.
Throughout, my focus is on tychistic chance, which I distinguish from deterministic chance. If
the fundamental laws of nature are deterministic, then tychistic chances are just truth-values—
the tychistic chance of ‘p’ will be 0 if ‘p’ is false and 1 if ‘p’ is true. It is only when the fundamental
laws of nature are probabilistic that we can have non-trivial tychistic chances.
2. Throughout, I’m going to sloppily use regular quotation marks for quasi-quotation.
3. Hawthorne & Lasonen-Aarnio (2009)
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of ‘Lucky wins’. If Sundar actually wins, then what it takes for ‘Lucky wins’ to
be true is for Sundar to win. If Evîn actually wins, then what it takes for ‘Lucky
wins’ to be true is for Evîn to win. Even though we don’t know what the truth-
conditions of ‘Lucky wins’ are, we know for sure that those truth-conditions
have a 1% objective chance of being satisfied. Whoever Lucky is, they have a
1% chance of winning the prize, same as everyone else. A principle of chance
deference will therefore tell us to be 1% sure that Lucky wins. But surely we
should be nearly 100% sure that Lucky wins. It is, after all, a priori knowable
that, if anybody wins, then Lucky does.4
In the second place, principles of chance deference appear to give bad ad-
vice when you have lost track of the time. For instance, you may have evidence
about today’s chances without having evidence about, for instance, Monday’s
chances or Tuesday’s chances. In cases like this, when we apply the standard
principles of chance deference to the Monday chances, they will tell you that
your credence in ‘p’ should diverge from what you know for sure to be today’s
chance of ‘p’.
In a companion paper, Expert Deference De Se, I introduce an emendation
to standard principles of expert deference which allows them to deal with de se
thoughts—thoughts aboutwho you are, where you are, orwhat time it is. In this
paper, I will motivate and explore what this general principle has to say about
showing deference to the objective chances. The principle of chance deference
I will defend differs from more familiar principles of chance deference in two
ways. In the first place: I will not tell you to align your credence in ‘Lucky wins’
with the objective chance of Lucky winning—instead, I will tell you to align
your credence in ‘Lucky wins’ with the objective chance of an appropriately
chosen surrogate of ‘Lucky wins’. In the second place: I will only tell you to
align your credences with the objective chances conditional on who you are,
and when and where you are located in space and time.
In a slogan, my proposal is this: you should defer to the objective chances
about whether your thoughts are true, given your location, where a location is
a thought which specifies who you are, where you are, and what time it is. I’ll
close by applying this principle of chance deference to Adam Elga’s Sleeping
Beauty puzzle.5 David Lewis took his principle of chance deference to mili-
4. Similar cases are discussed in Schulz (2011), Titelbaum (2012), Nolan (2016), and Salmón (2019).
5. Elga (2000)
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tate against Elga’s ‘thirder’ solution to that puzzle.6 However, the principle of
chance deference I will propose here is perfectly consistent with the ‘thirder’
solution. In contrast, it is inconsistent with Lewis’s own ‘halfer’ solution.
2 | lewis’s principle of chance deference
David Lewis thought that you should defer to the objective chances by adhering
to the following principle.7
lewis’s principle of chance deference
For any thought ‘p’, any numbern%, and any time t, your credence
in ‘p’, given that the time t chance of ‘p’ is n%, should be n%,
(lcd) C(p | Cht(p) = n%)
!= n%
(so long as you lack any time t inadmissible information)
Let me offer a few comments on this principle. Firstly, on notation: ‘C(p)’ is
your credence function. You hand it a thought, ‘p’, and it hands you back a
number between 0% and 100%. ‘C(p | q)’ is your conditional credence func-
tion. You hand it a pair of thoughts, ‘p’ and ‘q’, and it hands you back a number
between 0% and 100% which indicates how confident you are in ‘p’, on the in-
dicative supposition that ‘q’ is true. In a conditional credence C(p | q), I’ll call
‘q’ the antecedent and ‘p’ the consequent. If the antecedent is epistemically im-
possible, then a rational conditional credence will not be defined. Throughout,
whenever I write a schematic formula like lcd specifying what your condi-
tional credences should be, I only mean to endorse substitution instances for
which the antecedent is epistemically possible. If the antecedent is epistemi-
cally possible but is given a credence of zero, then the conditional credence will
only be defined relative to the additional parameter of a partition.8 I’ll ignore
issues having to do with conditioning on credence zero thoughts in the main
body, but I’ll have more to say about them in the footnotes.9 I will take it for
6. Lewis (2001).
7. See Lewis (1980). lcd isn’t the same as Lewis’s Principal Principle, though it follows from the
Principal Principle given the updating rule of conditionalisation.
8. See Easwaran (2019). I say that the set of thoughts r partitions ‘q’ iff it is a priori knowable that q
is true iff exactly one of the thoughts in r is true and for no thought ‘r ’ in r is it a priori knowable
that ‘r ’ is false. And r is a partition just in case it partitions a tautology.
9. Lewis thought that no epistemically possible thought should be given a credence of zero, so
he was not concerned with relativising conditional credences to partitions. (This required him
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granted that your conditional and unconditional credences are related in the
following way, for any ‘p’ and ‘q’: C(p | q) ·C(q) = C(p∧q).10 “Cht” is the def-
inite description “the time t objective chance function”. Thus, ‘Cht(p) = n%’
says that the time t objective chance of ‘p’ is n%. I place an exclamation mark
over an equals sign to indicate that the equality ought to hold, and not that it
does hold. Thus, lcd says what your credences ought to be like; it doesn’t say
anything about what they are like.
Finally, two comments on terminology. Firstly, Lewis calls information
‘time t inadmissible’ iff the information is about times after t. So long as you
are at a time before t, the only way Lewis thought you could come to have in-
admissible information was by way of time travellers, crystal balls, oracles, and
the like. So long as there’s no funny business like that, and so long as it’s be-
fore the time t, Lewis’s criterion of inadmissibility will allow us to ignore the
parenthetical proviso. Secondly, I stipulatively reserve ‘thought’ for whatever
the arguments of your credence function happen to be. In his A Subjectivist’s
Guide to Objective Chance, Lewis assumes that the arguments of your credence
function are truth-conditions, or sets of metaphysically possible worlds. How-
ever, he treats this as a simplifying assumption which would be lifted in a more
general treatment.11 In general, Lewis takes the arguments of your credence
function to be properties, or sets of centred possible worlds.12 So, for Lewis,
thoughts are properties. If your credence in a property is high, then you are
confident that you have the property—low, and you are not confident that you
have the property.
I’ll argue in §§2.1–2.2 that Lewis’s principle lcd faces two kinds of prob-
to use infinitesimal credences—for more, see Williamson (2007), Easwaran (2014), and Hájek
(ms).) If we part ways with Lewis and allow that an epistemically possible thought may be given
a credence of zero, then the natural partition to use in understanding lcd is {Cht(p) = n% |
n% ∈ [0,1]}.
10. I will assume throughout that your unconditional credences satisfy the following two rationality
constraints: (i) if it’s a priori knowable that ‘p’ is true, then C(p) =100%; and (ii) if it’s a priori
knowable that no two of ‘p1’, ‘p2’, ‘p3’, . . . are both true, then C(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ p3 ∨ . . . ) = C(p1) +
C(p2) + C(p3) + . . . . I will also take for granted that your conditional credences satisfy the
following rationality constraint, known as conglomerability: for any thoughts ‘p’ and ‘q’, and any
set of thoughts r which partitions ‘q’, your conditional credence C(p | q) lies in the range of the
conditional credences C(p | r). That is:
inf
r∈r
C(p | r) 6 C(p | q) 6 sup
r∈r
C(p | r)
11. See Lewis (1980, p. 268).
12. See Lewis (1979).
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lems. In the first place, it faces problems with a priori knowable contingencies.
(This problem has been noted and discussed by Hawthorne & Lasonen-Aarnio
(2009), Schulz (2011), Nolan (2016), and Salmón (2019), among others.) In the
second place, it faces problems in cases where you’ve lost track of the time. (To
my knowledge, this second problem has not been recognised before.)
2.1 A Priori Knowable Contingencies
To illustrate the first problem, suppose that we are going to flip a coin at time t,
and, at some point before t, I introduce the name “Uppy” by saying “Let’s call
whichever side of the coin actually lands up ‘Uppy”’. Let ‘u’ be the thought that
the coin lands with Uppy facing up. Then, if we set ‘p’ equal to u and we set
n equal to 50%, lcd tells us that your credence in ‘u’, given that the objective
chance of ‘u’ is 50%, should be 50%.
C(u | Cht(u) = 50%)
!= 50%
But you know for sure that the objective chance of ‘u’ is 50%. For you know
for sure that Uppy is either heads or tails. If Uppy is heads, then the chance of
the coin landing on Uppy is the chance of the coin landing on heads, which is
50%. And if Uppy is tails, then the chance of the coin landing on Uppy is the
chance of the coin landing on tails, which is 50%. So, either way, the chance of
the coin landing on Uppy is 50%.13 If C is a probability—and I’ll suppose for
the nonce that it is—and you know something for sure, then you may ignore it
when it appears as an antecedent in a conditional credence. That is: if C(q) =
100%, then C(p | q) = C(p). So lcd says that your credence in ‘u’ should be
50%,
C(u) != 50%
This looks like bad advice. After all, it is a priori knowable that the coin lands
on Uppy (so long as it lands on anything at all). So it looks like your credence
in ‘u’ should be close to 100%, and not down around 50%.
One reaction to this kind of case is to suggest that the naming ceremony
in which “Uppy” was introduced has provided you with some kind of inad-
missible information. Appeals to inadmissibility often show up in conversa-
13. Actually, the chance that a flipped coin lands heads is best understood as a deterministic chance,
not a tychistic chance (which ismy focus here). I’ll stick to coin flips in the interests of readability,
but if we want to be ideally careful, we should think of the coin as a quantum system in the state√
1/2 · |heads⟩ +
√
1/2 · |tails⟩, and we should think of ‘flipping’ the coin as measuring whether
it is in the state |heads⟩ or |tails⟩.
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tion about the case, and more careful versions of the reaction show up in the
work of Wolfgang Schwarz and Jack Spencer.14 While a naïve version of the re-
sponse faces some serious problems, themore careful approach of Schwarz and
Spencer is able to successfully deal with this problem. However, the principles
advocated by Schwarz and Spencer will still face the second difficulty which I
will introduce in §2.2 below.
Let me make two points about the naïve version of this response. Firstly, if
the dubbing ceremony provides youwith inadmissible evidence, then inadmis-
sible evidence is much easier to come by than Lewis indicates inA Subjectivist’s
Guide to Objective Chance. As I mentioned in §2.1 above, so long as they are
sitting around before the time t, Lewis thought that ordinary humans left to
their own devices would only have time t admissible evidence. It is only with
time travel or prognostication that ordinary humans could come to possess in-
admissible information.15 But ordinary humans left to their own devices are
perfectly capable of introducing names like “Uppy” without the assistance of
crystal balls, oracles, or timemachines. Secondly—andmore importantly—we
can generate this problem for lcd without any dubbing ceremony or the intro-
duction of any name at all. All we need is the rigidified definite description
‘the side of the coin which actually lands up’. You should be certain, or nearly
certain, that the side of the coin which actually lands up lands up, but you are
also certain, or nearly certain, that the chance of this happening is 50%. We can
even create this kind of trouble for lcd with just demonstratives like ‘this coin’.
So it seems that any solution which appeals to the kind of knowledge gained in
dubbing ceremonies isn’t going to solve the problem in general.
I take it that what drives this kind of response to the problem is the idea
that you simply shouldn’t be deferring to chance about thoughts like ‘the coin
lands on Uppy’. This is a natural thought, and while it isn’t implied by Lewis’s
admissibility clause, it can be developed into an adequate solution to the puzzle.
For instance, Schwarz offers the following emendation of lcd (the difference is
14. See Schwarz (2014) and Spencer (2020).
15. Admittedly, Lewis had adopted amuchmore liberal conception of inadmissibility by 2001, when
he said that learning what time it is can provide you with inadmissible information about the
future, “namely, that [you] are not now in it” (Lewis, 2001, p. 175). I won’t have anything to say
about this view of admissibility beyond the following observation: if all it takes to have time t
inadmissible information is to know that it is now before t, then we would have inadmissible
evidence about the outcome of a coin flip whenever we know that the coin flip will take place in
the future. So, if we understand ‘inadmissibility’ in this incredibly liberal sense, principles like
lcd won’t constrain our credences in even this paradigm case.
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in the parenthetical proviso):16
schwarz’s principle of chance deference
For any thought ‘p’, any numbern%, and any time t, your credence
in ‘p’, given that the time t chance of p is n%, should be n%,
(scd) C(p | Cht(p) = n%)
!= n%
(so long as you don’t have any time t inadmissible information,
and so long as the thought ‘p’ is apt for deference at t).
So long as the thought ‘the coin lands on Uppy’ is not apt for deference, scd
won’t fall prey to the counterexample which beset lcd.
What scd is capable of telling us depends upon how many thoughts are
apt for deference at t; and, before it tells us anything at all, we must have an
account of which thoughts are apt for deference at t and which are not. A
natural suggestion is this: a thought is not apt for deference at t whenever the
truth-conditions of that thought depends upon matters which are chancy at t.
That is: ‘p’ is apt for deference at t iff, for some truth-condition (some set of
metaphysically possible worlds) P , there’s a positive chance at t that P is the
truth-condition of ‘p’, and there is a positive chance at t that P is not the truth-
condition of ‘p’. This first pass suggestion might require further Chisholming,
but it will do as a rough-and-ready characterisation of which thoughts are apt
for deference at t.
2.2 Losing Track of the Time
To illustrate the second problem, suppose that you don’t know whether it’s
Monday or Tuesday, but you think it’s equally likely to be either. That is: you’re
50% sure that today is Monday, and 50% sure that today is Tuesday. And, while
you don’t know what day it is, you know for sure that today’s chance of Sec-
retariat winning the race (‘w’) is 75% and that yesterday’s chance of Secretariat
winning the race was 25%. Then, if we set ‘p’ equal to ‘w’, t equal to Monday
(mon), and n% equal to 25% and 75%, respectively, both lcd and scd tell us
that
C(w | Chmon(w) = 25%)
!= 25%
16. See §3 of Schwarz (2014). Schwarz intends his principle to apply to deterministic chances as well
as tychistic chances; for this reason, his explicit presentation of the principle has some additional
bells and whistles which mine lacks. In the present context, I’m only concerned with tychistic
chance. See footnotes 1 and 13.
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and C(w | Chmon(w) = 75%)
!= 75%
You know for sure that Chmon(w) = 25% iff it is Tuesday (‘tuesday’), and you
know for sure that Chmon(w) = 75% iff it is Monday (‘monday’). If C(q) > 0
and you know for sure that q↔ r , then C(p | q) = C(p | r). So this implies:
C(w | tuesday) != 25%
and C(w |monday) != 75%
Since you are 50% sure that it is Monday and 50% sure that it is Tuesday, this
implies (via the law of total probability) that
C(w) = C(w |monday) ·C(monday) +C(w | tuesday) ·C(tuesday)
!= 75% · 50%+25% · 50%
= 50%
But this looks like bad advice. After all, you know for sure that today’s chance
of Secretariat winning is 75%. Given that, it seems that you should be 75% sure
that Secretariat wins, and not merely 50% sure.
A thought like ‘Secretariat wins’ should count as apt for deference on ei-
ther Monday or Tuesday. The race won’t be run until Wednesday (let’s say),
and there doesn’t seem to be any funny business with naming. Moreover, ‘Sec-
retariat wins’ will count as apt for deference according to the rough-and-ready
characterisation I offered Schwarz above. On Monday, it is not a matter of
chance what the truth-conditions of ‘Secretariat wins’ are. So ‘Secretariat wins’
should be apt for deference.
But there is another way out: lcd and scd will only imply that your cre-
dence that Secretariat wins should be 50% if we assume that you don’t have any
Monday-inadmissible information. And you might suspect that, in this case,
you do have some Monday-inadmissible information. After all, for all you’re
in a position to know for sure, today is Tuesday. And if it is Tuesday, then your
knowledge that today’s chance of ‘w’ is 75% is Monday-inadmissible informa-
tion.
It’s true that, if today is Tuesday, then your information that today’s chance
of ‘w’ is 75% will be about times after Monday, and so will count as Monday-
inadmissible, according to Lewis’s criterion. But nothing about the case re-
quires us to suppose that today is Tuesday. Suppose that, unbeknowst to you,
today is in fact Monday. If that’s the case, then your information that today’s
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chance of ‘w’ is 75% will not be about times afterMonday, and so will not count
as inadmissible, given Lewis’s criterion. More broadly, if today is in fact Mon-
day, then, given that there are no crystal balls or oracles around, it’s difficult to
see how you could have come by any information about times after Monday.
And so it’s difficult to see how you could have acquired any information which
is inadmissible, given Lewis’s criterion.
But perhaps we should revise Lewis’s criterion of inadmissibility. Perhaps
we should say that information is time t inadmissible iff, for all you’re in a po-
sition to know for sure, it is about times after t.17 Then, we could say that, since
the information ‘today’s chance of ‘w’ is 75%’ might be about times after Mon-
day, you should not defer to the Monday chances. As I’ll discuss in §3.3 below,
I think that there is something deeply right about this response. In particular, I
think that you have sufficient reason to have a credence of 75% in ‘w’, in spite of
the fact that your expectation of the Monday chance of ‘w’ is 50%. Moreover, I
think that this is true precisely because you think that it might be Tuesday. In
§3.2 below, I’ll provide a criterion of inadmissibility according to which, in this
case, you haveMonday inadmissible information. While I think that we should
say that you have inadmissible information in this case, I don’t think this is suf-
ficient to resolve our puzzle, without any further revision to the principles lcd
or scd. Suppose that there is a countable infinity of times, t1, t2, t3, . . . , which
might, for all you know, be the current time. As before, while you don’t know
the time, you do know that the current chance of Secretariat winning is 75%.
In this kind of case, a principle of chance deference should tell you to set your
credence in ‘w’ to 75%. However, if knowing something about what the ti+1
chances might be is all that it takes for you to have time ti inadmissible infor-
mation, then you will have information which is time ti inadmissible, for every
time ti . And, in that case, neither lcd nor scd would tell you to defer to the
chances at any time. And so neither would require your credence in ‘w’ to be
75%.
3 | chance deference de se
Principles of chance deference like lcd and scd are instances of a broader class
of principles of expert deference. And, in general, principles of expert defer-
ence face difficulties when it comes to de se thoughts—thoughts which are in
17. Cf. Wilson (2014, §6), who suggests that you should not defer to the chances when you have
evidence which might be about the future.
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part about who you are and where you are located in space and time. For in-
stance, let the relevant expert be Beyoncé’s doctor. A naïve principle of doctor
deference would tell Beyoncé that, given that her doctor’s credence in ‘p’ is
n%, her credence in ‘p’ should be n%, too. That is, if ‘C’ is Beyoncé’s credence
function, then:
C(p | D =D) !=D(p)
where ‘D’ is the definite description ‘Beyoncé’s doctor’s credence function’, and
‘D ’ is any particular probability function.
Set ‘p’ equal to the de se thought ‘I am sick’ (‘s’). Then, this principle of
doctor deference will tell Beyoncé: “given that your doctor is confident in ‘I
am sick’, you should be confident in ‘I am sick’, too”. But this is terrible ad-
vice. When Beyoncé’s doctor entertains the thought ‘I am sick’, they entertain
a thought which is true iff they are sick. When Beyoncé entertains that same
thought, she entertains a thought which is true iff she is sick. Since there’s no
connection between Beyoncé’s health and her doctor’s health, she should not
see her doctor’s high credence in ‘I am sick’ as imposing any rational constraint
on her own credence in ‘I am sick’. (The reader may suspect that the doctor’s
thought ‘I am sick’ is not the same as Beyoncé’s thought ‘I am sick’. These kinds
of worries are addressed in the companion paper Expert Deference De Se, §2
and appendix A.)
Beyoncé should not defer to her doctor by setting her credence in ‘I am sick’
equal to the doctor’s credence in that same de se thought. Instead, she should
defer to them by setting her credence in ‘I am sick’ equal to their credence in
some appropriately chosen surrogate of that de se thought. In this case, the ap-
propriate surrogate is ‘Beyoncé is sick’. In §3.1, I will provide a general surrogate
which you should use whenever you are deferring to an expert.
3.1 Locational Surrogates
As a rough, first-pass suggestion: the general surrogate for your thought p
should be ‘your thought p expresses a truth’. Then, our principle of expert def-
erence would tell us: given that the expert is n% confident that your thought
p expresses a truth, you should be n% confident in p. This first-pass sugges-
tion runs into difficulties when either you or the expert are unsure of who you
are, where you are, or what time it is. To deal with these kinds of cases, I’ll
say what it is for a thought to be a location, and then, rather than looking at a
single surrogate for your thought p, I’ll look at a family of surrogates: one for
each potential location. This surrogate will say, roughly and metaphorically,
that p expresses a truth for the person at that location. The resulting principle
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of expert deference will say (roughly): given that you are at a location, λ, your
credence in p should be equal to the expert’s credence that p expresses a truth
for someone at λ.
I’ll explain what I mean by calling a thought a location by starting with
the notion of a purely de se thought. A thought is purely de se iff it only says
something about who you are, or when and where you are located in space
and time, and it doesn’t additionally tell you anything about what the world
is like—that is, it doesn’t provide you with any de dicto information. Then, a
location is a thought which is strong enough to settle the truth-value of all of
your purely de se thoughts—and no stronger. In other words: a location tells
you who you are, where you are, and what time it is in as rich a detail as your
purely de se thoughts will permit—and it doesn’t tell you anything more than
this. Despite the suggestive name, a location is not a person, place or time. It is
just a particular kind of thought. I’ll talk about being at or occupying a location,
but this is just a helpful metaphor. When I say that you are at the location λ, I
just mean that λ expresses a truth for you. As a notational convention, I’ll use
lowercase Greek letters like ‘λ’ to indicate that a thought is a location (except
‘ω’, which I reserve for worlds—see below).
We can similarly define a world to be a thought which is strong enough to
settle the truth-value of all of your de dicto thoughts—and no stronger. In other
words: a world tells you exactly what things are like, in as rich a detail as your
de dicto thoughts will permit—and it doesn’t tell you anything more than this.
Again, despite the name, a world is just a particular kind of thought. If I say
that you are in the world ω, I mean only that ω expresses a truth for you. As
a notational convention, I’ll reserve ‘ω’ for a world. Worlds will be compatible
with some locations, and incompatible with others.18 For instance, any world
which says that Beyoncé does not exist is incompatible with a location which
tells you that you are Beyoncé. If a world ω and a location λ are compatible,
then call the pair (ω,λ) a centred world. If (ω,λ) is a centred world and the
material conditional ‘(ω∧λ)→ p’ is a priori knowable, then say that ‘p’ is true
at the centred world (ω,λ).
Locations allow us to express the thought that ‘I am sick’ is true for Beyoncé.
Let ‘s’ be the thought ‘I am sick’, and let ‘β’ be Beyoncé’s location. Then, wemay
let ‘sβ ’ be a thought which is true so long as ‘s’ is true when entertained at the
location ‘β’. That is, we can say that ‘sβ ’ is true at a centred world (ω,α) so
18. The world ω is incompatible with the location λ iff ‘∼(ω∧λ)’ is a priori knowable.
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long as 1) (ω,β) is a centred world, and 2) ‘s’ is true at (ω,β). In general, take
any thought ‘p’, and any location, ‘λ’. Then, what we may call the λ-surrogate
of ‘p’—which I will write ‘pλ’—is a thought which is true so long as ‘p’ is true
when entertained at the location λ. More carefully, say that ‘pλ’ is true at a
centred world (ω,α) so long as 1) (ω,λ) is a centred world, and 2) ‘p’ is true at
(ω,λ).19
Now, we can give Beyoncé the advice: your credence in ‘s’ should equal
your doctor’s credence in the β-surrogate of ‘s’, ‘sβ ’. That is, if D is the definite
description ‘my doctor’s credence function’, and ‘D is any probability function,
Beyoncé’s credence function, C, should satisfy:
C(s | D =D) !=D(sβ)
This works well so long as Beyoncé knows for sure what her location is. But
what if she is uncertain about her location? Suppose, for instance, that Beyoncé
doesn’t knowwhether she is Kelly or Beyoncé. In that case, Beyoncé’s credences
should satisfy the following: given that she is Beyoncé and her doctor is n%
sure that Beyoncé is sick, she should be n% sure of ‘I am sick’. And, given that
she is Kelly and her doctor is n% sure that Kelly is sick, she should be n% sure
of ‘I am sick’. That is, if ‘β’ is Beyoncé’s location, ‘κ’ is Kelly’s location:
C(s | D =D ∧ β) !=D(sβ)
and C(s | D =D ∧κ) !=D(sκ)
More generally, you should defer to an expert, E , as described below:
expert deference de se
Given that the expert E ’s probability function is E, and given that
you are located at λ, your credence in ‘p’ should be E’s probability
in the λ-surrogate of ‘p’, ‘pλ’.20
C(p | E = E ∧λ) != E(pλ)
In a slogan: you should defer to the expert about whether your thoughts are
19. See §B.3 of the companion paperExpert DeferenceDe Se for amore general and careful definition
of the locational surrogate ‘pλ’.
20. If ‘E = E ∧ λ’ has a credence of zero, then this conditional probability should be relativised to
the partition of every epistemically possible conjunction which has the form ‘E = E ∧ λ’, with
‘E ’ fixed and ‘E’ and ‘λ’ variable.
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true, given the location at which you are entertaining them. (In the companion
paper, I give some reasons why this principle should be generalised further, but
those generalisationswon’t be relevantwhen the expert is the objective chances,
so I’ll ignore them here.21)
Applying this general principle to the expert of chance, we should say this:
So long as you lack any time t inadmissible information, your cre-
dence in ‘p’, given that the time t objective chance function is Ch,
and given that you are located at λ, should be equal to Ch(pλ).
C(p | Cht = Ch∧λ)
!= Ch(pλ)
In a slogan: you should defer to chance about whether your thoughts are true,
given the location at which you are entertaining them—so long, that is, as you
lack any inadmissible information.
3.2 A Priori Knowable Contingencies
Return to the first problem for lcd—the problem with a priori knowable con-
tingencies. Recall: ‘u’ says that the coin lands on Uppy, where ‘Uppy’ is a name
for whichever side the coin actually lands on. Let ‘λ’ be your location, which
we’ll take you to know for sure (just for the sake of simplicity). Then, the λ-
surrogate of ‘u’, ‘uλ’ is a thought which is true so long as ‘u’ expresses a truth
at the location λ. Your location doesn’t play an important role in determining
the truth-conditions of ‘uλ’. ‘u’ will express a truth for you just in case it ex-
presses a truth for anyone else in your world. So, more simply, ‘uλ’ is a thought
which says that ‘u’ expresses a truth. Our proposed principle of chance defer-
ence says: your credence in ‘u’, given that the objective chance function is Ch,
should be the objective chance that ‘u’ is true.
C(u | Cht = Ch)
!= Ch(‘u’ is true)
(Since I’m supposing you know λ for sure, C(u | Cht = Ch∧λ) = C(u | Cht =
Ch), and for any chance function, Ch, Ch(uλ) = Ch(‘u’ is true).)
This is enough to solve our first problem. Even though there’s only a 50%
chance that the coin lands on Uppy, there is a 100% chance that your thought
21. As I also explain in the companion paper, we should limit the principle to only apply when the
location λ is atomic. (A location λ is atomic iff, for every world ω such that (ω,λ) is a centred
world, and for every thought p, either (ω∧λ)→ p or (ω∧λ)→∼p is a priori knowable.) I’ll
take it for granted throughout that all locations are atomic.
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‘u’ is true. If the coin lands heads, then ‘u’ will say that the coin lands on heads,
and this will be true. On the other hand, if the coin lands tails, then ‘u’ will say
that the coin lands on tails, and this will be true. So “u’ is true’ will be true no
matter how the coin lands. So the principle will tell you that
C(u | Cht = Ch)
!= 100%
And since it will say this for every potential chance function Ch, the principle
will imply that your unconditional credence in ‘u’ should be 100%.22
It’s worth going through that again, a bit more carefully. In this case, there
are two relevant scenarios. Either the coin will actually land heads, or it will
actually land tails. If the coin actually lands heads, then ‘u’ will be true if the
coin lands heads, and false if the coin lands tails. And if the coin actually lands
tails, then ‘u’ will be true if the coin lands tails, and false if the coin lands heads.




Here’s how to read the array: the first row gives us‘u’s truth-conditions, if we
suppose that the coin actually lands heads. So the first row tells us that, if the
coin actually lands heads, then ‘u’ is true in heads possibilities and false in tails
possibilities. The second row gives us ‘u’s truth-conditions, if we suppose that
the coin actually lands tails. So the second row tells us that, if the coin actually
lands tails, then ‘u’ is false in heads possibilities and true in tails possibilities.
The truth-conditions of ‘u’ vary, depending upon what things are actually
like. Because this is so, I will call the thought ‘u’ interesting. Contrast ‘u’ with
the thought that the coin lands on heads, which we can write ‘h’. This thought
has exactly the same truth-conditions (true in heads possibilities, false in tails




22. Here, I appeal to the principle of conglomerability (the third rationality constraint from fn 10).
For conglomerability implies that, if you have a set of thoughts r which partitions the thought
‘q’, and C(p | r) = n% for each ‘r ’ ∈ r, then C(p | q) = n%, too. For more on conglomerability,
see Easwaran (2013) and Easwaran (2019).
23. To be clear: I’m understanding these two-dimensional arrays epistemically, roughly as Chalmers
(2004, 2006a,b) understands them.
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Because this is so, I’ll call the thought ‘h’ boring.
If ‘p’ is a boring thought, then there will be no difference between the two-
dimensional array for ‘p’ and “p’ is true’. However, if ‘p’ is interesting, then
‘p’ and “p’ is true’ can have different truth-conditions. Take the thought “u’ is
true’. Consider first the possibilities in which the coin lands heads. In those
possibilities, ‘u’ will say that the coin lands heads. Since the coin does land
heads in those possibilities, what ‘u’ says in those possibilities will be true in
those possibilities. So “u’ is true’ will be true. On the other hand, consider the
possibilities in which the coin lands tails. In those possibilities, ‘u’ will say that
the coin lands tails. Since the coin does land tails in those possibilities, what ‘u’
says in those possibilities will be true in those possibilities. So “u’ is true’ will
be true in every possibility—and since nothing about the foregoing reasoning
hinged upon which world is actual, “u’ is true’ will have these truth conditions
no matter which world is actual.
“u’ is true’ heads tails
heads T T
tails T T
In general, when we ask whether ‘p’ is true at a possibility, we ask whether
what ‘p’ actually says is true at that possibility. Thus, when we ask whether
“p’ is true’ is true at a possibility, we ask whether what “p’ is true’ actually says
is true at that possibility. But “p’ is true’ is a boring thought—it has the same
truth-conditional content, no matter what the actual world is like. At every
possibility, “p’ is true’ is true iff what ‘p’ says at that possibility is true at that
possibility. And this doesn’t depend upon which possibility is actual. So, as a
helpfulmnemonic: when you askwhether ‘p’ is true at a possibility, ask yourself
whether what ‘p’ actually says is true at that possibility. But, when you ask
whether “p’ is true’ is true at a possibility, ask yourself whether what ‘p’ says at
that possibility is true at that possibility. In terms of the ‘two-dimensional’ array
for ‘p’, this is tantamount to asking yourself whether ‘p’ is true at the diagonal
cell in your column. That is: it is tantamount to asking yourself whether ‘p’
is true at a possibility, if that possibility is actual. So, in general, the truth-
conditional content of “p’ is true’ is just the diagonalised content of ‘p’. That is,
to get the two-dimensional array for “p’ is true’, just take the two-dimensional
array for ‘p’, and replace the truth-value of every non-diagonal cell in row r and
column c with the truth-value which appears in the diagonal cell in row c and
column c.
Because “u’ is true’ is necessarily true, it will have a chance of 100%, for
every potential time t chance function, Ch. (At least, it is necessarily true so
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long as the coin lands at all, and its chance will be 100%, conditional on the
coin landing.) And so our proposed principle of chance deference will tell you,
correctly, to be 100% confident that the coin lands on Uppy, given that it lands
at all.
This solution to the problemwith a priori knowable contingencies falls nat-
urally out, once we’ve modified our principle of chance deference to deal with
de se thoughts. But we could have independently motivated the solution by
noticing that your thoughts are not the same as chance’s thoughts. (Recall: I use
‘thought’ stipulatively for whatever the arguments of your credence function
are; and when I talk about chance’s thoughts, I am talking about the arguments
of the objective chance function.) Chance’s thoughts are just truth-conditions,
or sets of metaphysically possible worlds. Objective chances are something like
brute propensities of the universe to develop in different ways. When we say
that the objective chance of ‘p’ is n%, we mean that the universe has an n%
propensity to develop in such a way that ‘p’ will accurately describe it. So it
is only the truth-conditions of a thought which are relevant to the chances. If
‘p’ has the same truth-conditions as ‘q’, then the chance of ‘p’ must equal the
chance of ‘q’.24 In terms of the two-dimensional arrays from above: chance’s
probabilities are invested in the cells lying along the actual row. In contrast,
your thoughts are invested in the diagonal cells. For illustration, suppose that
the coin actually lands heads. Then, ‘u’ and ‘h’ have precisely the same truth-
conditions. So they have precisely the same chances. Nevertheless, your ratio-
nal credence in ‘h’ is 50%, whereas your rational credence in ‘u’ is 100%. This
can be explained within the two-dimensional array by noting that the diago-
nalised content of ‘u’ is necessary, whereas the diagonalised content of ‘h’ is
contingent. That is: no matter what the actual world is like, ‘u’ will actually
express a truth; whereas, if the coin actually lands tails, ‘h’ will actually express
a falsehood.
So your thoughts and chance’s thoughts are importantly different. How-
ever, so long as your thoughts are boring, this doesn’t lead to any difficul-
ties. If we are only considering boring thoughts, then the diagonal content
in which you invest credence will be true at a possibility just in case the truth-
24. At least, I will be taking this for granted here. There are some who have responded to the kinds
of puzzles from §2.1 by suggesting that chance distinguishes between truth-conditionally equiv-
alent contents. See, for instance, Nolan (2016) and Salmón (2019). (Though, it’s not clear to me
whether my disagreement with Nolan and Salmón is substantive. They may be using ‘chance’ to
refer to something other than tychistic chance, which is my exclusive focus here. See fns 1 and
13.)
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conditional content to which chance attaches probability is true at that pos-
sibility, too. So diagonal and truth-conditional content will align. However,
if your thought is interesting, like ‘u’, then diagonal content can come apart
from truth-conditional content. For instance, suppose that the coin actually
lands heads. Then, even though the diagonal content of ‘u’ is necessarily true,
the truth-conditional content of ‘u’ is false at possibilities where the coin lands
tails.
This explains both why Lewis’s principle of chance deference lcd works
so well when we confine our attention to boring thoughts, and why it runs
into troubles with interesting thoughts like ‘u’. It also points the way towards a
resolution: we need to find appropriate boring surrogates for your interesting
thoughts. We can then demand that your credence in the interesting thought
match the objective chance of its boring surrogate. The natural candidate for a
boring surrogate is the diagonalised content of ‘p’—that is, the natural candi-
date is “p’ is true’.
For interesting de dicto thoughts like ‘u’, diagonalised surrogates like these
work perfectly well. For de se thoughts, the additional bells and whistles of
locational surrogates are needed. And a principle of chance deference which
utilises locational surrogates subsumes a principle utilising diagonalised sur-
rogates. If an interesting thought ‘p’ is de dicto, then the locational surrogate
‘pλ’ (given some location ‘λ’) will be a priori equivalent to “p’ is true’. So, while
we could have solved the problem with a priori knowable contingencies with-
out wading into the complications of the de se, the de se principle of chance
deference I’ve proposed here automatically solves the problems with a priori
knowable contingencies.
3.3 Admissibility
As I formulated it above, the revised de se principle of chance deference only
applies when you lack inadmissible information. However, if we combine this
principle with ur-prior conditionalisation, it tells us exactly what your credences
should be, even if you have inadmissible information. The principle of ur-prior
conditionalisation I have in mind says that there should be some ur-prior cre-
dence function C0 (a credence function which it would be rational to hold in
the absence of any evidence) such that, for any ‘e’, when your total evidence is
‘e’, your credence in ‘p’, conditional on ‘q’, should be C0(p | q∧ e).25 Now, if we
25. See Meacham (2016) for more on ur-prior conditionalisation.
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set ‘q’ in this principle equal to ‘Cht = Ch∧λ’, it tells us that
C(p | Cht = Ch∧λ)
!= C0(p | Cht = Ch∧λ∧ e)
=
C0(p∧ e | Cht = Ch∧λ)
C0(e | Cht = Ch∧λ)
Now, we may apply our principle of chance deference to both the numerator
and the denominator of the fraction above. After all, the ur-prior credence
function C0 doesn’t have any inadmissible evidence—it doesn’t have any evi-
dence at all! So:







= Ch(pλ | eλ)
If you lack any time t inadmissible information, then our principle tells us that
C(p | Cht = Ch ∧ λ) should also be Ch(pλ). Therefore, if the evidence ‘e’ is
time t admissible, it should be that Ch(pλ | eλ) = Ch(pλ), for any thought
‘p’, and any potential chance function and location, Ch and ‘λ’. Set ‘p’ equal
to ‘e’, and this implies that it should be that Ch(eλ) = Ch(eλ | eλ) = 100%,
for any potential Ch and ‘λ’. So the principle of ur-prior conditionalisation
has provided us with a sufficient condition for inadmissible information. If
Ch(eλ) < 100% for any potential time t chance function and location, Ch and
‘λ’, then ‘e’ is time t inadmissible.
I propose we strengthen this sufficient condition for inadmissibility into a
necessary and sufficient condition. That is, I propose the following criterion of
inadmissibility:
inadmissible information
‘e’ is time t inadmissible iff, for some potential location and time t
chance function, ‘λ’ and Ch,26
Ch(eλ) < 100%
In this definition, a location ‘λ’ and a time t chance functionCh are potential iff
your evidence is consistent with λ being your location andCh being the time t
objective chance function. That is: λ andCh are a potential pair of location and
26. Any name or definite description which you know for sure to denote a unique time is an accept-
able substituend for ‘t’. So, for instance, in the right circumstances, either ‘5:55 Tuesdaymorning’,
or ‘five minutes from now’ could be substituted for ‘t’. The same goes for the ‘t’ which appears
in the principle dscd below.
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time t chance function iff your total evidence doesn’t entail ‘∼(Cht = Ch∧λ)’.
In a slogan, the criterion tells us that ‘e’ is inadmissible iff it might be news to
the objective chances.
Given this criterion for inadmissibility, we may provide a fully general
principle of chance deference which applies even in cases where you have in-
admissible information.
de se chance deference
If ‘e’ is your time t inadmissible information, then your credence
in ‘p’, given that the time t objective chance function is Ch, and
given that you are located at λ, should be equal to Ch(pλ | eλ).27
(dscd) C(p | Cht = Ch∧λ)
!= Ch(pλ | eλ)
If you do not have any time t inadmissible information, then ‘e’ will be a tautol-
ogy, and the principle will tell us that C(p | Cht = Ch∧λ) ought to be Ch(pλ).
We’ve already seen how this principle solves our first problem (the problem
with a priori knowable contingencies). It also solves the second problem (the
problemwith losing track of the time). Recall, in the problem case, you are 50%
sure that today is Monday, 50% sure that today is Tuesday, and you know for
sure that today, the chance of Secretariat winning the race (‘w’) is 75%, and that
yesterday, the chance of ‘w’ was 25%. Let ‘µ’ be anyMonday location, and let ‘τ ’
be any Tuesday location. Then, notice that the information that today’s chance
of ‘w’ is 75%—‘Chtoday(w) = 75%’—is Monday inadmissible. The reason is
that this information might be news to the Monday chance function. For τ is
a potential location, and if you are at the location τ , then the τ-surrogate of
‘Chtoday(w) = 75%’ (namely: the Tuesday chance of ‘w’ is 75%) is news to the
Monday chance function.
In this case, there are two relevant kinds of potential Monday chance func-
tions: those according to which the chance of ‘w’ is 75% and those according
to which the chance of ‘w’ is 25%. Take an arbitrary function of the first kind
and call it ‘Ch75%’. Take an arbitrary function of the second kind and call it
‘Ch25%’. You know for sure that Chmon = Ch75% only if today is Monday, and
you know for sure that Chmon = Ch25% only if today is Tuesday. Now, since
27. If ‘Cht = Ch∧λ’ has a credence of zero, then this conditional probability should be relativised
to the partition of every epistemically possible conjunction which has the form ‘Cht = Ch∧λ’,
with ‘Cht ’ fixed and ‘Ch’ and ‘λ’ variable.
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‘Chtoday(w) = 75%’ is your total inadmissible information, dscd implies that
C(w | Chmon = Ch75% ∧µ)
!= Ch75%(w | Chtoday(w) = 75%µ)
= Ch75%(w | Chmon(w) = 75%)
and C(w | Chmon = Ch25% ∧ τ)
!= Ch25%(w | Chtoday(w) = 75%τ )
= Ch25%(w | Chtues(w) = 75%)
Assuming that the chance function knows its ownvalues for sure,Ch75%(Chmon(w) =
75%) = 100%, so the first constraint above implies that
C(w | Chmon = Ch75% ∧µ)
!= Ch75%(w) = 75%
And, assuming that the objective chances defer to their future selves,28 Ch25%(w |
Chtues(w) = 75%) = 75%, so the second constraint above implies that
C(w | Chmon = Ch25% ∧ τ)
!= 75%
Since µ,τ,Ch75%, and Ch25% were arbitrary, the same will hold for any poten-
tial Monday location, any potential Tuesday location, any potential Monday
chance function which gives a 75% probability to ‘w’, and any potential Mon-
day chance function which gives a 25% probability to ‘w’. Since these are the
only kinds of potential locations and Monday chance functions, we will have
in general:29
C(w) != 75%
And the second problem is resolved.
4 | sleeping beauty
The principle of chance deference I’ve developed here has a surprising conse-
quence for Adam Elga’s Sleeping Beauty puzzle.30 In this puzzle, we imagine
that on Sunday evening, you are informed of the following: you will be put to
sleep with a powerful sedative and awoken on Monday morning. On Monday
evening, you will be put back to sleep and a fair coin will be flipped. If this coin
28. More carefully, I am assuming that, for any times t, t∗ such that t < t∗, and any p in the domain
of the chance function, Cht(p | Cht∗ (p) = x) = x.
29. Here, I again appeal to the principle of conglomerability. See footnote 22.




Figure 1: The thirder thinks you should have the credence distribution in figure 1a,
whereas the halfer thinks you should have the credence distribution in figure 1b.
lands heads, then you will be kept asleep throughout Tuesday, and you will not
be awoken again until Wednesday. If, on the other hand, the coin lands tails,
then your memories of Monday will be erased, and you will be awoken again
on Tuesday. Also, just by the way: you are beautiful.
When you awake onMondaymorning, you know for sure that, if it is Tues-
day, then the coin flip on Monday landed tails. However, you don’t know for
sure whether it is Monday or Tuesday. For all you know for sure, it is Tues-
day and your memories of being awoken on Monday have been erased. The
central debate over Sleeping Beauty concerns how confident you should be that
Monday’s flip landed heads, ‘h’. So-called thirders say that your credence in ‘h’
should be one third. They advocate the credence distribution shown in fig-
ure 1a.31 So-called halfers are unhappy with this distribution, in part because it
means that your credence in ‘h’ departs from the known Monday chance of ‘h’.
They say instead that your credence in ‘h’ should be one half.32 They advocate
the credence distribution shown in figure 1b.33
Let’s use ‘µ’ for any arbitrary Monday location, and ‘τ ’ for any arbitrary
Tuesday location. Let ‘Ch’ be any potential Monday chance function. And let
‘a’ be the thought ‘I am awake’. Importantly, ‘a’ is information you have when
you wake up on Monday—this is the information which allows you to rule out
that it is Tuesday and the coin landed heads.34 Moreover, given our criterion
for inadmissibility, this information will count as Monday inadmissible. For τ
31. See, for instance, Elga (2000), Elga (2004), Dorr (2002), Arntzenius (2003), Hitchcock (2004),
Horgan (2004), and Weintraub (2004).
32. See, for instance, Lewis (2001), Halpern (2004), Bostrom (2007), and Meacham (2008).
33. Of course, the thirder and halfer positions are not exhaustive. For one alternative, see the ‘im-
precise’ suggestion discussed in Monton (2002) and defended in Singer (2014).
34. Horgan (2004) and Weintraub (2004) both make the observation that you learn ‘a’ upon awak-
ing.
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is a potential location, and the τ-surrogate of ‘a’, ‘aτ ’—which says that you are
awake on Tuesday—is news to the Monday chances. Because you’re awake on
Tuesday iff the coin lands tails, the Monday chances think that there’s only a
50% probability that you’ll be awake on Tuesday, Ch(aτ ) = 50%. (Of course,
‘aµ’ is not news to the Monday chances—the Monday chances know for sure
that you are awake on Monday.)
Then, dscd implies that
C(h | Chmon = Ch∧µ)
!= Ch(hµ | aµ)
But the Monday chances are already certain that aµ, and ‘h’ is a boring and de
dicto thought, so its µ-surrogate ‘hµ’ is just ‘h’, so this reduces to
C(h | Chmon = Ch∧µ)
!= Ch(h) = 50%
Moreover, since this holds for any potential Monday chance function Ch, this
implies that35
C(h | µ) != 50%
And since this holds for any potential Monday location µ, this in turn implies
that
C(h |Monday) != 50%
(where ‘Monday’ is the de se thought that today is Monday.)
This is a powerful constraint. It is incompatible with the halfer’s favoured
distribution, and compatible with the thirder’s. So, surprisingly, if we accept
the principle of chance deference which I’ve developed here (for quite indepen-
dent reasons), then it will be the thirder, and not the halfer, who properly defers
to the known chances. It is of course true that the thirder’s credence in ‘h’ is not
equal to the known chance of ‘h’. But, if we accept my proposed criterion of in-
admissibility, then the thirder has a ready excuse: their credence in ‘h’ departs
from the known chance of heads because they have the inadmissible informa-
tion that they are awake. This is not information which is about times after
Monday, so it will not count as inadmissible according to Lewis’s criterion. It
is, after all, Monday, and there are, after all, no time travellers, oracles, crystal
balls, nor any other form of divination or prognostication. Nonetheless, it is in-
formation which might be news to the Monday chances—for it might be Tues-
35. This and the next inference rely upon the principle of conglomerability. See fn 22.
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day, and if it is Tuesday, then your being awake is news to the Monday chances.
So it counts as inadmissible information given our criterion. And, given that
they have this inadmissible information, the thirder is correctly showing def-
erence to the objective chances.
23 of 23
references
Arntzenius, Frank. 2003. “Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflec-
tion.” In Journal of Philosophy, 100 (7): 356–370. [21]
Bostrom, Nick. 2007. “Sleeping beauty and self-location: A hybrid model.” In
Synthese, 157: 59–78. [21]
Chalmers, David J. 2004. “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.” In Philo-
sophical Studies, 118 (1/2): 153–226. [14]
Chalmers, David J. 2006a. “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Seman-
tics.” In Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, edited
by M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [14]
Chalmers, David J. 2006b. “Two-Dimensional Semantics.” In Oxford Hand-
book of the Philosophy of Language, edited by E. Lepore & B. Smith, Oxford:
Oxford University Press. [14]
Dorr, Cian. 2002. “Sleeping Beauty: In Defense of Elga.” In Analysis, 62 (276):
292–296. [21]
Easwaran, Kenny. 2013. “Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—
and Conglomerability and Reflection.” In Philosophy of Science, 80: 119–142.
[14]
Easwaran, Kenny. 2014. “Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.” In The Philo-
sophical Review, 123 (1): 1–41. [4]
Easwaran, Kenny. 2019. “Conditional Probabilities.” InOpen Handbook of For-
mal Epistemology, edited by Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg, chap-
ter 4, 131–198. [3], [14]
Elga, Adam. 2000. “Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem.” In
Analysis, 60 (2): 143–147. [2], [20], [21]
Elga, Adam. 2004. “Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief.” In Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 69 (2): 383–396. [21]
Hájek, Alan. ms. “Staying Regular?” [4]
Halpern, Joseph Y. 2004. “Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and
reflection in asynchronous systems.” In Proceedings of the Twentieth Confer-
ence on Uncertainty in AI. 226–234. [21]
Hawthorne, John & Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria. 2009. “Knowledge and Objec-
tive Chance.” In Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough &
Duncan Pritchard, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 92–108. [1], [5]
Hitchcock, Christopher. 2004. “Beauty and the Bets.” In Synthese, 139: 405–
420. [21]
Horgan, Terrence. 2004. “Sleeping Beauty awakened: New odds at the dawn of
the new day.” In Analysis, 64: 10–24. [21]
Lewis, David K. 1979. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” In The Philosophical
Review, 88 (4): 513–543. [4]
Lewis, David K. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” In Stud-
ies in Inductive Logic and Probability, edited by Richard C. Jeffrey, Berkeley:
University of California Press, volume II, 263–293. [3], [4]
Lewis, David K. 2001. “Sleeping Beauty: reply to Elga.” In Analysis, 61 (3):
171–176. [3], [6], [21]
Meacham, Christopher J. G. 2008. “Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De
Se Belief.” In Philosophical Studies, 138 (2): 245–269. [21]
Meacham, Christopher J. G. 2016. “Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-
Prior Conditionalization.” In Ergo, 3 (17). [17]
Monton, Bradley. 2002. “Sleeping Beauty and the Forgetful Bayesian.” InAnal-
ysis, 62 (1): 47–53. [21]
Nolan, Daniel. 2016. “Chance and Necessity.” In Philosophical Perspectives,
30 (1): 294–308. [2], [5], [16]
Salmón, Nathan. 2019. “ImpossibleOdds.” InPhilosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 99 (3): 644–662. [2], [5], [16]
Schulz, Moritz. 2011. “Chance and Actuality.” In Philosophical Quarterly,
61 (242): 105–129. [2], [5]
Schwarz, Wolfgang. 2014. “Proving the Principal Principle.” In Chance and
Temporal Asymmetry, edited by Alistair Wilson, Oxford University Press,
81–99. [6], [7]
Singer, Daniel Jeremy. 2014. “Sleeping beauty should be imprecise.” In Synthese,
191 (14): 3159–3172. [21]
Spencer, Jack. 2020. “No Crystal Balls.” In Noûs, 54 (1): 105–125. [6]
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2012. “An Embarrassment for Double‐Halfers.” In
Thought, 1 (2): 146–151. [2]
Weintraub, Ruth. 2004. “Sleeping Beauty: the Simple Solution.” In Analysis,
64 (1): 8–10. [21]
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. “How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?”
In Analysis, 67 (3): 173–180. [4]
Wilson, Alastair. 2014. “Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty.” In The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65 (3): 573–598. [9]
